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Abstract: This article argues that the emergence of a specific financial struc-
ture called the donor advised fund (DAF) developed in tandem with postwar 
efforts to extend the private sector’s reach into public welfare through new 
forms of charitable giving and voluntarism. In charting the gestation, birth, 
and expansion of DAFs from the late nineteenth century to our present day, it 
contends that the longstanding tension in American life between state-based 
regulation and individual freedoms has stood at the heart of debates about 
charitable tax law. Far from simply reflecting reigning historical forces, DAFs 
came to shape ideologies about public and private good in American life. A 
sea change in charitable giving occurred after the passage of the 1969 Tax Re-
form Act. In response, tax attorneys and charitable organizations sought to ex-
tend the designation of “public charity” to protect individuals’ charitable as-
sets from being treated as “private foundations,” which were subject to new 
tax burdens and reporting obligations. By looking in particular at American-
Jewish philanthropic activism during this period, the article concludes that 
DAFs emerged as one, among a handful, of new financial vehicles that em-
powered private wealth and decision-making with the privileges of putatively 
public charitable entities.    
Tax policy shapes people’s lives, but historians have not always no-
ticed its human implications. In the 1970s and 80s, the field of history 
turned its attention to studying the experiences of average people, and poli-
cy history, including tax policy, flagged. After all, policymaking that hap-
pened through Congressional vote and relied upon legalistic discourse hard-
ly seemed the domain of the common folk. Yet over the past few years, co-
incident with the financial recession of 2008, a growing number of histori-
ans have recognized the many ways that financial policy and the formation 
of American capitalism affected American lives 1 Whether a newcomer to 
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the United States, a member of a racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual minority 
group, a woman, a child, or an elite politician, Americans all experienced 
the structures that limned capitalist expansion. Close examinations of trans-
formations in tax policy, thus, have slowly started to weave their way into 
broader historical inquiry. 
This article argues that the emergence of a specific financial structure 
called the donor advised fund (DAF) developed in tandem with postwar 
efforts to extend the private sector’s reach into public welfare through new 
forms of charitable giving and voluntarism. In charting the gestation, birth, 
and expansion of DAFs from the late nineteenth century to our present day, 
I explain that the longstanding tension in American life between state-based 
regulation and individual freedoms has stood at the heart of debates about 
charitable tax law. Since the advent of the federal income tax in the early 
twentieth century, Congress has injected protections of individual freedom 
into tax code, creating a basic irony in tax policy that empowers the state, in 
part, by its ability to provide individuals and entities with exceptions from 
its pecuniary demands. My aim is not to explicate the legal principles of 
DAFs, something others in this volume will do to better ends. Rather, in 
setting DAFs in their historical context, we learn that far from simply re-
flecting reigning historical forces, DAFs came to shape ideologies about 
public and private good in American life. 
First, a word about sources is in order. I contend throughout that tax 
code should be read with the same critical eye as any other primary histori-
cal document. Its expression in Congressional acts and Internal Revenue 
Service publications is only one instantiation of tax policy. Its application 
by lawyers, accountants, advisors, and individual citizens must not be ne-
glected in favor of formal code. Here things get tricky. Tax returns can pro-
vide evidence of application, but they are also often highly-stylized docu-
ments, interesting for the conventions more than the realities they reflect. 
Since my own research focuses on the formation of Jewish philanthropic 
structures over the course of the twentieth century, I have pulled a number 
of examples of the application of tax principles and law from Jewish institu-
tions and individuals. This represents more than happenstance because Jew-
ish tax lawyers and Jewish philanthropic institutions were among the pio-
neers in codifying and employing DAFs. Nonetheless, I caution the reader 
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against assuming direct proportionality between my examples and Jews’ 
involvement in DAFs. 
THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF CHARITABLE EXEMPTIONS 
Well before the advent of the American income tax, states and govern-
ing powers used exemption from taxation as a tool for conferring special 
status to individuals or institutions, most frequently those associated with 
religion. In the United States, common practice has long exempted religious 
property from taxation. The reasons for doing so include precedent in Eng-
lish common law, churches’ own tithing systems, and the idiosyncrasies of a 
disestablishment clause that the courts have interpreted as mandating equal 
treatment of all religions without precluding governmental encouragement 
of religion. Throughout the nineteenth century, as religious denominations 
proliferated, states’ property tax exemptions helped new religious institu-
tions fill their coffers with funds undiminished by taxes and enabled them to 
thrive and expand in the American landscape. What one historian of Ameri-
can religion has characterized as the nineteenth-century democratization of 
American Christianity must, in part, be recognized as a function of govern-
mental tax expenditures (the flipside of a tax exemption) that favored the 
growth of multiple religious institutions.2 
Yet property tax exemptions for religious institutions in the nineteenth 
century also provided states with a conduit for managing religious life. In-
deed, as legal historian Sarah Barringer Gordon argues, the disestablishment 
of religion in the United States intersected with new modes for states to 
regulate religious institutions. The property tax exemption was one of the 
most significant ways for state legislatures to maintain a measure of control 
over disestablished churches. For example, while states exempted religious 
institutions from paying taxes on their property, many also put into place 
strict limitations on how much property those institutions could own. Gor-
don explains, “Religious societies became the quintessential private asso-
ciations, simultaneously supported and disciplined by states.”3 
Complementing policies that exempted religious groups from paying 
property tax, architects of American political structure expressed a com-
mitment to allowing collective “associations,” from fraternal lodges to be-
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nevolent societies, to thrive in the new country. In American political 
thought, the concept of associational life evolved as a state-supported 
sphere that stood midway between the individual and the government. Not 
only would the government contract itself to make room for group life, it 
also would offer specific protections—including tax subsidies—to these 
groups. In turn, associations allowed governing powers jurisdiction over 
their structure, organization, and mission. In other words, in order to benefit 
from the favors of the state, private associations had to put themselves in 
the public domain by meeting certain requirements of what eventually be-
came termed the “public good.”4 
Religious institutions served as test cases for generating policy to facil-
itate what we might think of association-based liberalism. Historians of 
American religion explain that religious competition and pluralism thrived 
in the United States because of the young country’s commitment, in theory 
though certainly not always in practice, to allowing associations to have 
equal legal standing, protections, and privileges, so long as each group ad-
hered to certain legal standards. States endowed private assets, most im-
portantly property such as church buildings or the homes that clergy occu-
pied, with the interests of the public good by using those assets as levers for 
supporting and regulating group life. Thus, the policy makers’ case for pri-
vate property rights, a fundamental component of capitalism and philan-
thropy, hinged not only upon individual interest but was also buttressed by 
the notion of public interest.5 
Even as state legislatures and courts pledged themselves to the dises-
tablishment of religion and the freedom of private associations, they also 
ensured their control over defining the structure of American associational 
life. Prominent in nineteenth-century case law relating to religious and 
secular associations were disputations about property and wealth. Out of 
these decisions emerged a set of principles that guided the development of 
American philanthropy as the overarching mechanism for funding religious 
and secular associational life. The same tension between private freedom 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See John Brooke, “Ancient Lodges and Self-Created Societies: Voluntary Association and 
the Public Sphere in the Early Republic,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert eds., Launching 
the “Extended Republic”: The Federalist Era, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1996): 273-359, and “Consent, Civil Society, and the Public Sphere in the Age of Revolution and 
the Early American Republic,” in Jeffrey L. Pasley et. al. eds., Beyond the Founders: New Ap-
proaches to the Political History of the Early Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004): 207-250; and Johann Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners: Democracy and Civil 
Society in Early National Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
 5 See Gordon, “The First Disestablishment”; Steven Green, The Second Disestablishment: 
Church and State in Nineteenth-Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity; and Robert Wuthnow and D. Michael 
Lindsay, “The Role of Foundations in American Religion,” American Foundations: Roles and 
Contributions, ed. Helmut K. Anheier and David Hammack (Brookings Institution Press, 2010). 
 Lila Corwin Berman 9 
and state regulation that coursed through disestablishment debates in the 
nineteenth century limned the formation of American philanthropy. Tax pol-
icy at the state and, eventually, federal levels emerged as a pivot point in 
these debates because it made visible government regulation in a sphere 
putatively defined by its separation from governing powers.6 
TAX LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN PHILANTHROPIC 
ORGANIZATIONS 
By the final decades of the nineteenth century, critics from many cor-
ners raised concerns about the generally enfeebled state of American tax 
and monetary policy. They worried that a tax system fueled almost exclu-
sively by import duties and excise taxes would fail to keep up with the de-
mands of a growing nation confronting new pressures from industrializa-
tion, immigration, and urbanization. Economic crises, particularly the se-
vere depression that started in the spring of 1893, highlighted these misgiv-
ings and forced American lawmakers to rethink revenue-raising strategies, 
risk management, and the allocation of relief funds. 
Populists argued that much of American tax strategy operated regres-
sively, protecting those with the most wealth. According to critics, import 
duties and excise taxes, which raised revenue for the federal government, 
trickled down to consumers through the commodities they purchased. Eve-
ryone from the richest to the poorest paid the same amount for a particular 
commodity, and, thus, poor people paid a higher percentage of their assets 
on commodity-based taxes. Even state property taxes appeared to safeguard 
the wealth of the wealthy; because only real property was taxed, other 
forms of property, especially salaries and other intangible forms of property 
(such as stock and partnership interest) held primarily by wealthy individu-
als, were left as untaxed assets.7 
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Responding to economic crisis and critics of taxation policy, Congress 
passed a new tariff law in 1894 that contained the first ever peacetime fed-
eral income tax provision. The law also sought to respond to social scien-
tific studies on rising inequality and pragmatic concerns about how to man-
age a massive population explosion. Progressive economists of the day ad-
vocated state-mandated “fiscal citizenship,” with individual obligations to 
finance social equality. Hardly a radical measure by modern terms, the law 
mandated a 2 percent flat tax rate, exempted incomes under $4000, and did 
not differentiate between earned and inherited income. Furthermore, its po-
tential for success was severely limited by the law’s failure to establish clear 
methods and agencies for its enforcement.8 
The very next year, the Supreme Court overturned the 1894 legislation, 
declaring its attempt to levy a direct tax unconstitutional and setting the leg-
islative course for the creation of an income tax through a constitutional 
amendment. The short-lived 1894 law, however, contained a clause that 
would come to define the following century’s worth of charitable tax law: 
“[N]othing herein contained shall apply . . . to corporations, companies, or 
associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or ed-
ucational purposes . . . .”9 
Following upon the states’ ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, 
which gave Congress the power to tax income, Congress passed the Under-
wood-Simmons Tariff Act in 1913 to enact the modern income tax. The 
1913 law reintroduced the 1894 act’s clause exempting charitable, religious, 
and educational organizations. One version of the 1913 law went as far as to 
propose deductions for individual contributions to these organizations. Alt-
hough rejected in the final act, individual charitable deductions were soon 
passed as part of the War Revenue Act of 1917.10 
Notable for its exponential increase of income tax rates in order to 
support American efforts in World War I, the 1917 revenue act confirmed 
that the income tax was here to stay and with it progressive measures to tax 
the highest earners and asset holders at the highest rates. In the midst of 
their boosted faith in individual taxation and fiscal citizenship, however, 
lawmakers were careful to protect the structures of private associationalism 
and denominationalism that had emerged as central to American democracy 
in the prior century. They did this most clearly through the individual chari-
table deduction. Now payments made to organizations defined by law as tax 
exempt, including those with charitable, religious or educational purposes, 
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could be deducted from an individual’s income and, thus, from his tax bur-
den. Significantly, Congress limited the maximum deduction an individual 
could take to 15 percent of one’s income. Over the following decades, as 
Congress amended its tax policies, that percentage grew until 1969, when it 
stood at 50 percent.11 
One might wonder why, just as the United States was scrambling to 
raise wartime funds, Congress would allow for a mechanism, such as the 
charitable deduction, to deplete treasury dollars. The answer reflected an 
enduring commitment to private modes of governance: allowing individuals 
to make decisions about and for the public good. As Senator Henry Hollis 
from New Hampshire explained to his colleagues in 1917, “Now, when war 
comes and we impose these very heavy taxes on incomes, that will be the 
first place where the wealthy men will be tempted to economize, namely in 
donations to charity.” 12 In the Senator’s calculation, individual philanthrop-
ic acts were as valuable to American life as collective fiscal obligations; 
thus, Congress agreed to permit limited charitable, religious, and education-
al deductions even as they cut into treasury revenue. 
New income tax policies initiated an unprecedented intimacy between 
tax policy and philanthropy. Changing ideals about the proper balance be-
tween public and private governance in a healthy democracy shaped tax 
policy and philanthropic structures. At the same time, pragmatic considera-
tions spurred by the Great Depression, and political angling on the part of 
business interests also molded the contours of tax and philanthropic policy. 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REFORM AND THE BIRTH OF DAFS 
During an era of tax innovation and code making, one could witness 
parallel experimentation in the philanthropic sector. By the first few dec-
ades of the twentieth century, several new vehicles for philanthropic activ-
ism emerged, including private foundations, community chests, and com-
munity foundations. Although each had precedent in earlier eras, the chang-
es in tax law were instrumental in helping to shape their strategies and pur-
poses. 
Cleveland, one of the most important manufacturing centers and the 
fifth largest city in the United States by the early twentieth century, served 
as an important hub for philanthropic creativity. The city’s wealth combined 
with its rapid growth and the attendant problems of poverty, inequality, and 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Mehrotra, Making the Modern American Fiscal State, 298-307; and Vada Waters Lindsey, 
“The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and a Look to the Future,” Nebras-
ka Law Review 81, 3 (2002): 1056-1096. 
 12 Quoted in Mark Rambler, “Best Supporting Actor: Refining the 509(a)(3) Type 3 Charita-
ble Organization,” Duke Law Journal 51, no. 4 (Feb. 2002): 1370-1371. See also Zunz, Philan-
thropy in America, at 88-89. 
12 The Rise of Donor-Advised Funds: Should Congress Respond?  
social disorder prodded leaders to think about how private dollars, along-
side public ones, might improve the city for all of its inhabitants and for 
ongoing business success.13 
In 1913, Cleveland established the first community chest organization 
in the nation. An umbrella or federated charitable institution, it was mod-
eled on the Jewish Federation. Jewish leaders in Boston established the first 
Federation at the end of the nineteenth century, and the model quickly 
spread to other American cities, including Cleveland, with significant Jew-
ish populations. Federated philanthropies solicited donor dollars, deposited 
them in a single and undifferentiated account, and then disbursed them ac-
cording to decisions made by leaders or a committee. With certain excep-
tions, federated charities, such as Jewish Federations or community chests, 
allocated exactly the amount of money they took in every year. 
In 1914, one year after Cleveland leaders established the city’s com-
munity chest, a local banker and attorney Federick H. Goff initiated another 
charitable structure, the community foundation, with an entirely different 
plan of operation from that of federated charities. Instead of paying out the 
amount of charitable dollars that came in each year, Goff’s model was 
premised upon distributing only the investment earnings on charitable dol-
lars, while holding the principal as an endowment fund. Goff’s Cleveland 
Foundation, the first of its kind, became the template for community foun-
dations across the nation. 
Central to Goff’s community foundation was the creation of an elite 
board, empowered to make charitable allocations. Goff worried that long 
after a donor had died, his “dead hand” continued to exercise control over 
philanthropic funds through bequest arrangements. A “dead hand” of an 
extraordinarily wealthy private foundation donor, such as Andrew Carnegie 
and John D. Rockefeller, might stymie philanthropic innovation. Instead, 
Goff constituted a living board of prominent community leaders to control 
the Cleveland Foundation and make philanthropic decisions by committee. 
They took a professional approach to decision-making, often guided by re-
search reports and data, to steer the foundation’s course. Board members 
held convening power to persuade other wealthy families to contribute to 
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the foundation and to accept the board’s decisions about charitable alloca-
tion and endowment building.14 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, powerful and wealthy leaders in var-
ious cities created community foundations and pledged themselves to an 
endowment model of charitable aggregation, with a professionalized ap-
proach to distribution decisions. Unlike federated charities, community 
foundations attenuated the act of charitable giving from the distribution of 
charitable dollars. By designating the earnings on investment as the dollars 
that would circulate to charity, yet also classifying the totality of assets 
(principal and earnings) held within the foundation as charitable, leaders of 
community foundations reconfigured the charitable process. 
According to several sources, including its own website, the New York 
Community Trust, founded in 1924 and modeled on the Cleveland Founda-
tion, opened the first “donor advised fund” in 1931. This claim of origina-
tion reveals very little, in part because neither the fund nor the New York 
Community Trust was subject to any specific regulations that set it apart 
from other qualifying charitable monies or entities. Furthermore, the termi-
nology of a “donor advised fund” is anachronistic, since no one used that 
language—or any other unique nomenclature—to distinguish these charita-
ble funds from others until several decades later.15 Indeed, I have yet to see 
a source that clarifies anything particularly distinctive about the 1931 fund 
or its difference from earlier charitable funds held by community founda-
tions. 
Still, in their unnamed infancy, community foundation funds supported 
an endowment model of charitable giving and offered the individual the 
opportunity to name their funds and, often, suggest a purpose for their earn-
ings to the board. At the same time, by aggregating funds in community 
foundations, donors also agreed to a collective process of rule by a profes-
sionalized board that would extend beyond their lifetime. Community foun-
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dation boards, historically comprised of wealthy community leaders who 
also kept their money in the community foundation, protected individual 
donors’ charitable interests and gave individuals informal, if not formal, 
methods of accounting for how their money was spent. Further research 
should explore whether donors to community foundations funds received 
reports on expenditures and earnings and the extent of control they exer-
cised over them. 
TAX REFORM AND THE PRIVATIZED PUBLIC 
Throughout the interwar years—a period marked by prosperity in the 
1920s and, then, the upheaval of the Great Depression—philanthropic activ-
ism and professionalization expanded. Charitable organizations raised more 
dollars than ever before. Economists, gaining mainstream authority, sup-
ported this expansion by outlining family budgets complete with charitable 
lines in the pages of popular magazines. Professional fundraisers made it 
their life’s work to tap into these budget lines. Between 1921 and 1928, 
Americans increased their philanthropic giving from $1.75 billion to $2.5 
billion, and the number of Americans who gave likewise rose.16 
Until recently, historians have understood the Great Depression and the 
New Deal as ushering in an era of greater state intervention and dismantling 
private control over social welfare. However, more recent assessments of 
the economic theories, political policies, and powerful figures at the heart of 
reconstructing America’s political-economy after the Great Depression con-
clude that private and corporate interests gained significant power to deter-
mine and profit from public programs. The charitable deduction was one 
mechanism through which this expansion could occur since it allowed indi-
viduals to reduce their overall tax liability by directing a portion of their tax 
dollars according to their own determination. 
Even in 1938, as the Great Depression ravaged American life, Con-
gress maintained the charitable deduction and, in 1944 during World War II, 
shifted the tax formula in such a way as to increase the percentage of one’s 
income that could be deducted for charitable purposes.17 Policymakers re-
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mained convinced that philanthropic dollars more than outweighed treas-
ury’s tax expenditure and, also, freed up public money to serve other 
needs.18 Political scientist Jacob Hacker contends, “Contrary to the tradi-
tional emphasis on the critical breakthroughs of the New Deal and Great 
Society, the late 1930s through the late 1950s were pivotal years in the es-
tablishment of America’s public-private welfare regime . . . .” 19 By the post-
World War II years, as corporations grew ever larger, the stock market em-
braced a broader investing public, and the philanthropic sector expanded, 
the line between public and private governance blurred often impercepti-
bly.20 
By the 1950s, some American political leaders, especially on the right, 
found the hazy division between public and private rule discomfiting and, 
even, nefarious. Indeed, one possible interpretation of the Red Scare is that 
McCarthyites feared that the public—the government—was losing its con-
trol over private life and its ability to guard against covert powers making 
their way into public policy. Layered upon suspicion of underground power 
networks were business interests’ concerns that their own power would be 
compromised by workers’ collective organizing and the resurgence of union 
politics after World War II. By aligning with the government’s anti-
communist agenda, business leaders positioned themselves as acting along-
side government in the interest of the public good.21 
Although charitable foundations hardly took center stage as the targets 
of anti-communist fervor, they stood among other private entities as suspect 
for their relatively unregulated freedom to influence public life. As historian 
Olivier Zunz explains, “America’s largest foundations provided funds and 
collaborated in organizational strategies with the U.S. government” and 
foundation leaders and foreign policy elites shared close ties.22 Throughout 
the 1950s, conservative critics voiced concern that the largest charitable 
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foundations served as leftist fronts. In 1952 Congress launched hearings to 
determine whether philanthropic entities were involved in “un-American” 
or “subversive” activities. In the end, these investigations came up empty, 
but they served to heighten scrutiny of the philanthropic enterprise.23 
Criticism of foundations gained traction in the 1960s as it crossed par-
ty lines. A set of vocal Democrats in Congress, including Representative 
Wright Patman (Texas) and Senator Albert Gore (Tennessee), pressed for 
Congressional investigations and Treasury studies into foundations 
throughout the 1960s. They gave voice to populist fears that foundations 
only deepened the concentration of power in the hands of a few wealthy 
families. As some striking examples of malfeasance and self-dealing on the 
part of foundations emerged, a broad base in Congress agreed that reform 
was in order. By the late 1960s, reformatory measures to end foundation 
abuses gained bipartisan support and made their way into the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969.24 
Most significantly, the 1969 act formalized a stark division between 
public charities and private foundations. According to the new law, any 
charity classified as public, including all educational and religious organiza-
tions, received immunity from most regulatory demands, since Congress 
determined that these organizations by their very nature acted in the best 
interest of the public. In contrast, private foundations, as a class, faced sev-
eral new regulations to bolster their accountability to the public and to limit 
the tax incentives (or public subsidies) they received. In the eyes of Con-
gress, individual control over private foundations would be counter-
balanced by a public regulatory and reporting apparatus placed upon those 
private foundations. Despite pending proposals at the time, Congress 
stopped short of limiting the lifespan of private foundations, a proposal that 
some legislators had hoped would decisively block long-term abuses of 
power. 
Clearly, the reforms intended to create new measures of public ac-
countability for those philanthropic bodies—so-called private ones—that 
offered donors the most command over their dollars. Yet, even as the legis-
lation mandated reporting requirements, excise taxes, spend-out percent-
ages, and caps on deductions for private foundations, it left open several 
safe harbors for philanthropic funds that acted in similar ways to private 
foundations yet channeled their money through public structures, such as 
community foundations or federated charitable bodies. The true origin of 
the donor advised fund rests in these safe harbors and their close ties to the 
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endowment model of charity that had already emerged in the early twentieth 
century. The intersection of these two modes—charitable endowments and 
individual donor control over public charitable dollars—can be closely ob-
served by tracing the emergence of DAFs in Jewish philanthropy. 
DAFS IN THE AMERICAN JEWISH PHILANTHROPIC COMPLEX 
For the student of American philanthropy, it should come as little sur-
prise that Cleveland and Jews together played a significant role in shaping 
twentieth-century philanthropic innovation. As discussed above, Cleve-
land’s mix of wealth and social need provided fertile ground for philan-
thropic experimentation, and by the early decades of the twentieth century, 
Jews distinguished themselves as able philanthropic practitioners. In the late 
nineteenth century, they created the Jewish Federation system, a philan-
thropic institution that mirrored the semi-autonomous communal structures 
that governed much of European Jewish life. Jews established chapters of 
the Federation in almost every American city in the first decades of the 
twentieth century, and by World War II almost 300 chapters existed in North 
America. Although each was different, Federations all raised money 
through annual campaigns and then relied upon committees (similar to 
community foundation boards) to allocate those dollars to domestic and 
foreign Jewish causes. Cleveland’s Jewish Federation, one of the earliest in 
the country, was founded in 1903 and, by the middle decades of the century, 
it served as a centerpiece of the city’s philanthropic vitality.25 
By the middle of the twentieth century, a Jewish lawyer named Nor-
man Sugarman emerged as an activist in American tax law reform and Jew-
ish philanthropic expansion by popularizing new charitable models, includ-
ing the donor-advised fund. Born in 1917 in Cleveland, Sugarman moved in 
1940 to Washington, D.C., where he served as an attorney for the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue (renamed the Internal Revenue Service in 1953). In his 
role at the IRS, he worked with legislators on tax reform, developing sever-
al new tax forms and issuing policy rulings, many related to charitable ex-
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emptions. His intimate familiarity with tax code—he provided language that 
made its way into legislation—proved invaluable to him when he moved 
back to Cleveland in 1954 and joined a large private firm there, where he 
grew his practice around charitable giving by donors and organizations 
qualifying for charitable tax exemptions.26 
In testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means in Feb-
ruary 1969, Sugarman set out his vision for the proper balance between 
governmental regulation and individual autonomy in the charitable sector. 
He vehemently opposed proposed measures that would impose taxes on 
unrelated trade or business income. He explained, “To tax a charitable or-
ganization does not carry out Congress’ purpose in allowing the charitable 
organization to exist in the first place. Taxing the organization would re-
move funds that would otherwise be available for the charitable purpose.”27 
He concluded his testimony, “I believe that a sound principle is that legisla-
tive solutions which restrict the private sector of our economy should be 
imposed only with respect to problems requiring resolution and should go 
no further than the specific bounds of those problems.”28 In other words, 
stop egregious abuses of tax exemptions, but avoid regulatory over-
reaching. He realized, however, that whatever the specifics of the new law, 
charitable giving was set on course to change immensely.29 
In workshops for community foundations and, especially, the Jewish 
Community Federation of Cleveland, Sugarman made it his business to ed-
ucate leaders to anticipate tax changes poised to become law by the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969. The core component of his advice revolved around ways 
that his clients could benefit from the law’s division between public chari-
ties and private foundations. Sugarman well understood the advantages that 
public charities and their donors would receive. He also knew that with the 
passage of the law, charities that did not fall squarely on one side of the di-
vision would have the opportunity to craft a narrative to prove their status in 
the eyes of the IRS. Sugarman urged his clients to join one’s fate to the pub-
lic side rather than hold onto a private status and lose tax benefits and other 
freedoms. As such, he advised his clients to create a historical record prov-
ing their public mission and showing their effort to attract a broad base of 
donors. He also worked to educate his clients’ donors about the tax benefits 
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of giving appreciated stock and securities as donations. To this day, while a 
contribution of cash offsets income by the amount of the contribution, a 
contribution of appreciated assets provides a double benefit because it pro-
vides both an income tax deduction and avoids capital gains taxes on the 
appreciation. 
Immediately after the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Sugar-
man toured the country, speaking to community foundations and Jewish 
organizations about how to comply with and gain from the Act. To a Jewish 
group in Kansas, he enthused that “with some imagination and use of initia-
tive” the new tax law held exciting opportunity. Sugarman consistently 
made two recommendations to his audiences: that they petition the IRS 
immediately for designation as a public charity; and that they turn attention 
to building endowment funds.30 
Sugarman’s suggestions, of course, reflected his intimate understand-
ing of the new tax code and several elements of it that he had helped craft. 
The Code, indeed, gave clear preferential treatment to public charities over 
private foundations and, simply put, positioned public charities to aggregate 
resources more effectively. For example, when it came to distributing dol-
lars held by charitable organizations, private foundations were now subject 
to a payout rule (as modest as it was at five percent), while public charities 
were not; and private foundations owed an excise tax on certain kinds of 
investment income, whereas public charities did not. Thus, a public charity 
served as a more efficient vehicle for holding endowment funds and could 
offer individuals immediate tax deductions, whether or not those funds were 
spent.31 
The status of a community foundation was not entirely clear in the new 
tax landscape, and Sugarman realized that the sooner community founda-
tions and Jewish Federations could set precedent for their designation as 
public charities, the more likely the law would support such designations. 
As soon as the law passed, Sugarman, in his capacity as legal counsel for 
the Cleveland Jewish Federation, requested and received a private-letter 
ruling from the IRS to recognize the Federation as a “publicly supported 
organization.”32 
In addition to enabling the Federation to receive the favorable tax 
treatment afforded to public charities, the IRS ruling also opened the door to 
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a new revenue stream for community foundations and Jewish Federations: 
dissolved private foundations. In his conversations with Jewish Federation 
executives, Sugarman strongly urged them to establish close relationships 
with families who held private foundations and would bear the burden of 
the new tax law’s regulations. The skilled Federation executive, armed with 
knowledge of tax changes, could convince these families to transfer the as-
sets from their private foundations into public charitable housings, such as a 
Jewish Federation. Sugarman explained that private family foundation as-
sets, when properly placed in public charities, could gain all the benefits of 
public charities and still provide the donor with a measure of control.33 
For the case he wanted to mount to families with private foundations, 
Sugarman had to suggest that individual donors could retain power over 
funds housed in public charities. This was different from the longstanding 
practice of community foundations and Federations to designate a subset of 
donors, often the most elite and powerful ones, as a board or committee 
charged with determining philanthropic priorities; rather, Sugarman envi-
sioned individual donors’ maintaining clear, if not legally mandated, author-
ity over the designation of their charitable dollars, even as these dollars op-
erated in the space of a public charity. The IRS nodded toward an informal 
system of donor control, writing in a private-letter ruling to Sugarman (act-
ing as the attorney for the Cleveland Jewish Federation): “You will establish 
a fund which shall be known as the [a family’s name] Philanthropic Fund 
. . . . [The family] may submit to you names of organizations to which they 
recommend distributions be made. Such recommendations shall be solely 
advisory, and you may accept or reject them, applying reasonable standards 
and guidelines.”34 
Sugarman had succeeded in generating an IRS statement in favor of 
donor control over public charitable dollars. Of course, the ruling hedged on 
the extent of individual power by using words such as “recommend” and 
“advisory,” but it clearly allowed for public charities to protect individual 
decision-making capacity and to use this protection to entice private foun-
dations and other donors to store their charitable dollars in public housings. 
In Sugarman’s view, public charities stood to benefit from this arrangement, 
as they would gain power to convene fund holders, to influence their phil-
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anthropic decisions, and to operate and invest their funds. Foremost in Sug-
arman’s estimation was the fact that these funds could help build endow-
ments for community foundations and Jewish Federations. Much like Goff, 
who established the Cleveland Foundation, Sugarman believed that en-
dowed charities were the most effective tools for empowering philanthropy. 
In his speeches, Sugarman searched for the right terminology to de-
scribe these new quasi-private funds that would be housed in public chari-
ties. He often spoke of them as “philanthropic funds” and occasionally 
called them “advised” or “designated” funds. Only in the mid-1980s did 
Jewish Federation and community foundation professionals begin calling 
them donor-advised funds. 
In 1972, the Jewish Federation of Cleveland published a “Handbook 
for Charitable Giving” under Sugarman’s leadership and reprinted several 
of the private-letter rulings it had received.35 The handbook outlined the 
same set of advice Sugarman had already given handfuls of Federation and 
community foundation leaders, tax lawyers, and nonprofit associations.36 To 
a group of Jewish leaders in St. Louis, he reiterated, “[t]he basic point in-
volved in philanthropic funds is that it enables individuals, who would like 
to create a fund as a memorial, a monument, or for current charitable pur-
poses, to have the advantage of current income tax deductions in building 
such a fund, as well as the benefit of creating a permanent fund as part of 
their long-range program.”37 In the same lecture, he also extolled the virtues 
of so-called supporting organizations and other strategies for protecting in-
dividual donors’ autonomy while also growing community foundations’ 
endowment power. Sugarman was well aware that neither the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 nor IRS rulings gave individuals legal control of funds they 
designated to be held in public charities. But he believed mightily that en-
dowment dollars were essential to ensuring the strength of philanthropy, 
especially against other public sector and governmental programs, and he 
trained the leaders of Jewish Federations and community foundations to 
expect that in order to build their endowments, they would have to cede 
some element of collective governance to greater individual control, if not 
by law than by informal practice. 
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To his dismay, Sugarman encountered some Jewish leaders who were 
neither keen on his regard for the individual donor nor interested in entering 
the business of endowment building and fund management. Many Federa-
tion executives at the time were trained social workers and felt concerned 
that the core of their work—providing services to Jewish populations in 
need—would be compromised if they raised dollars outside of their annual 
fundraising campaign, sequestered portions of their charitable dollars to 
serve as endowments and not charitable allocations, and gave individual 
donors the opportunity to recommend how charitable money was spent.38 
In some cases, when Federation executives balked, wealthy Jewish 
leaders formed separate public charitable entities to build endowments and 
wrest themselves free of the traditional Federation model of distributing as 
many dollars as were raised in the annual campaign. For example, in 1972 a 
group of Jewish leaders with ties to New York City’s Federation formed the 
Jewish Communal Fund to house, invest, and grant money held in its en-
dowment, including individually named philanthropic funds.39 In general, 
religious institutions, including Catholic Charities, were some of the earliest 
adopters of these strategies to grow their philanthropic assets.40 
 Briefly—and worthy of deeper exploration elsewhere—Sugarman’s 
suggestions threatened to undermine the structure of collective giving so 
central to the rhetoric and, often, the purpose of Jewish philanthropy (as 
well as other federated philanthropy). His endowment model elevated indi-
vidual donors and their philanthropic priorities, and by design enabled the 
donors who gave the most money to set philanthropic agenda. Eventually, 
upon the death of a donor or some stipulated moment, the fund might merge 
into the collective fund and shed its traces of a specific donor’s intent. Sug-
arman, however, paid little attention to the re-collectivization of philan-
thropic funds, instead believing that simply aggregating these funds in Jew-
ish structures would redound benefit to Jewish philanthropic goals. 
Despite a core tension between Sugarman’s model and the Jewish Fed-
eration’s commitment to collective giving, Sugarman’s counsel provided a 
roadmap for its financial strategies. Indeed, by 1986, the Jewish Federation 
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system held $1 billion in endowment funds, and by 2013, its endowment 
was valued at $16 billion, with a full third of those dollars in DAFs.41 No 
longer did individual donors who gave money to a Jewish Federation, for 
example, have to consider their dollars as tied to the Federation’s mission. 
Rather, they could park their money there and then spend it when they 
wanted and as they wished. Indeed, a donor’s fund did not even have to 
help augment the endowment of a Federation, since he or she could treat the 
fund as a checkbook of sorts and not a place to aggregate charitable dollars. 
Charitable endowment practices grew with the rise of donor advised funds, 
but these same funds also broadened the ability of the donor to act and give 
in ways that did not necessarily strengthen the mission of a public charity. 
As the practice of donor designation of public charitable funds ex-
panded, the power of the individual grew. Even absent a new legal ruling 
that clarified the extent of an individual donor’s advisory capacity, the rule 
of common practice within community foundations and Jewish Federations 
alongside competition with commercial investment firms, (that starting in 
the early 1990s opened their own DAFs) all but formalized donor autono-
my. 
THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF DAFS 
By the early 1990s, commercial investment managers moved into the 
roles that tax lawyers and philanthropic advisors such as Sugarman had held 
just a few decades earlier. In the hands of business-school graduates and 
investment specialists, the possibilities for DAFs—as philanthropic vehi-
cles, investment holdings, and a management service offered by commercial 
financial entities—expanded. The number of DAFs grew steadily, reaching 
well above 200,000 by 2013 and holding an estimated $53.7 billion.42 Be-
yond anything else, these numbers indicated the entrance of commercial 
investment houses into the business of administering DAFs. 
In 1991, Fidelity Investments established the Fidelity Charitable Gift 
Fund with the blessing of a public charity designation from the IRS. The 
informality of the relationship between donors and their control over their 
funds held in public charities had changed very little from Sugarman’s days 
in the 1970s. But Fidelity had the size, personnel, and dollars to make DAFs 
into an industry. 
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Over the coming decade, as Fidelity programs succeeded in drawing 
clients to invest in its charitable portfolios, other commercial investment 
houses followed suit and established their own charitable funds. By 2000, 
investors could put money in DAFs held at Vanguard, Schwab, Oppenhei-
mer, and J.P. Morgan Chase. Investors who had never heard of DAFs 
learned about them through their financial advisors. Some, who had kept 
their charitable accounts at other public charities, including community 
foundations and Jewish Federations, moved their funds to the commercials 
in hopes of streamlining their investments or receiving more professional 
management of their charitable dollars, generally, though not always, at re-
duced management fees. At the same time, the commercials steadily worked 
to make their DAFs more attractive by lowering minimum contributions 
and grant amounts and encouraging investors to move a portion of their ap-
preciated marketable securities into DAFs, a move with clear tax benefits.43 
With the entrance of commercial investment services into the DAF in-
dustry, the community foundations and public charities that had once been 
the unrivaled holders of DAFs worried that they would lose their corner of 
the charitable market. Significantly, a lawyer representing Jewish Federa-
tion’s national office and a former IRS Commissioner himself, agitated for 
the IRS to scrutinize Fidelity’s practices more closely—though, perhaps 
equally significant, one of the chief architects of Fidelity’s DAF program 
was a Jewish woman named Jamie Jaffee who earned respect for her inge-
nuity from leaders of Jewish private foundations.44 
According to Donald Kent, former Director of Planned Giving and 
Endowment for the national office of the Jewish Federations, who served 
from 1986 to 2000, Jewish public charities initially felt threatened by the 
commercials because they could afford to take risks and push legal bounda-
ries. Some Jewish public charities, along with community foundations, wor-
ried about losing a critical income stream and element of their grant making 
work to the commercials. They responded by lowering their investment 
fees, bringing in new investment talent, and lobbying Congress to clarify 
DAF practices in order to create a level playing field. At the same time, the 
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success of the commercials forced these public charities to better explain 
why their services—often marked by personal relationships and values-
based discussions with donors—were superior to those of the commercials. 
Over the long run Kent believed that the commercials conferred legitimacy 
to DAFs, helping all DAF-sponsoring charities attract more donors and as-
sets, and educating Jewish donors to seek DAFs out in Jewish organiza-
tions.45 
Nothing did more to sanction DAFs and broaden the industry than the 
passage of the Pension Protection Act in 2006. Until then, DAFs did not 
exist in IRS code or regulations. Indeed, one of the reasons it is so difficult 
to pinpoint when the first DAF came into existence is because the term it-
self held no legal standing until 2006, even as it was used in practice well 
before this. Had DAFs remained solely an instrument of community foun-
dations and a handful of other public charities, Congress likely would not 
have felt moved to define their legal terrain or impose excise taxes to pre-
vent abuses. Yet with the astronomical growth of the DAF field came some 
reports of abuse and, also, questions about their intermediary status as pub-
lic charitable funds that nonetheless gave individual donors free rein. 
Although it instituted modest regulations over the funds in 2006, Con-
gress did not substantially change DAFs in spirit. Proceeding with caution, 
Congress requested the Department of Treasury to perform studies about 
DAF practices. As reports came back, some members of Congress grew 
skeptical that DAFs were efficacious charitable vehicles and, thus, support-
ed payout requirements and other regulations on them.46 Still, at the mo-
ment of writing, little evidence points to a sea change of policy relating to 
DAFs. Though impossible to prove, we might surmise that by sharpening 
the legal status of DAFs, Congress helped them grow; since the passage of 
the Pension Protection Act, the number of DAFs and assets held within 
them has more than doubled.47 
CONCLUSION 
If one wished to understand philanthropy and its role in shaping nine-
teenth-century American democracy, he or she would begin by turning to 
excerpts from the Federalist Papers, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
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America (1835), and Andrew Carnegie’s “Gospel of Wealth” (1889). If one 
pursues the same task but wishes, instead, to understand how American phi-
lanthropy has changed over the course of the twentieth century, he or she 
should read tax codes, starting with the 1913 income tax and, also, private-
letter IRS rulings that paved the way for the creation of DAFs after the 1969 
Tax Reform Act. Simply put, these documents communicate core values 
about American democracy its restraints on individualism and collectivism. 
The rise of DAFs transformed the nature of American philanthropy by 
conferring upon private expenditures and decision-making the privileges of 
public sanction and subsidy. To be certain, the assets held in DAFs pale in 
comparison to tax revenue and government spending. Yet as an indication 
of attitudes toward social reform, the development and expansion of DAFs 
reveal a steady trend toward empowering private entities to set agenda 
when it comes to education, public health, social welfare, and more. In their 
observation of “sector blur,” recent critics have noted that the lines between 
government, the nonprofit world, and the private for-profit world have be-
come less distinct, especially as all of these sectors have looked toward the 
market as the indicator of their success.48 
While many DAFs take money in and spend it out quickly, the assets 
held in DAFs are always invested and those entities that house DAFs gener-
ally have an interest in maintaining those assets for the returns—including 
management fees, investment earnings, and portfolio strength—they might 
bring. The practices are in keeping with a growingly financialized model of 
post-industrial, globalized citizenship.49 Gerald Davis, a scholar of man-
agement, sociology, and finance, observes of this new era, following on the 
heels of the postwar years: “What emerged can be called a portfolio society, 
in which the investment idiom becomes a dominant way of understanding 
the individual’s place in society. Personality and talent become ‘human cap-
ital,’ homes, families, and communities become ‘social capital,’ and the 
guiding principles of financial investment spread by analogy far beyond 
their original application.”50 
Whether attached to endowment building aims or simply placed in 
commercial accounts, DAFs provide individuals with immediate tax bene-
fits and the ability to aggregate philanthropic dollars for an undetermined 
moment in the future. Housed in public charitable structures, these funds 
are imprinted with a responsibility to serve the public good in some fashion. 
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in Stanford Social Innovation Review, 13, no. 3 (Summer 2015). 
 49 On “financialization” see, Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of 
the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
 50 Davis, Managed by the Markets at 6, italics in original.  
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Yet as critics and policymakers weigh their efficacy, they confront the high 
burden of operating in the name of the public, especially when that public is 
disenfranchised from deciding how tax expenditures in the form of charita-
ble deductions are spent. Surely, our democracy has a long tradition of pro-
tecting individuals and investing in their innovations, sometimes at the ex-
pense of a broad public. As we examine our tax policies and their relation-
ship to our values about democracy, social justice, and equality, we would 
do well to dwell upon the extent to which our philanthropic apparatus ac-
cords with the content of those values. A tax system that rewards asset-rich 
individuals with more charitable spending power, dollar for dollar, may, in 
the end, be structurally incapable of moving our society closer toward true 
justice. 
	 
 
